Can a Hormuz Blockade Flip GOP Farm States in 2026?
Current Assessment
Our causal model estimates 22% probability. Kalshi markets price the top related contract (Will CPI rise more than 0.1% in June 2026?) at 5¢, while our thesis implies 96¢ — a +91¢ edge. Across 353 tracked contracts, we see systematic mispricing.
Latest evaluation (1h ago): Thesis confidence declined slightly due to a cooling in long-term inflation and commodity price expectations, which weakens the probability that rural voters will perceive a dramatic and politically blamable food price impact by the 2026 midterms.
Hormuz blockade disrupts fertilizer supply chains. Fertilizer prices spike, US farm costs surge, food inflation hits rural voters. GOP farm state advantage erodes heading into 2026 midterms. Timeline: planting season → harvest → food prices → November ballots.
Track Record
.033 batting average across 353 contracts. The lens has been mostly wrong on direction so far — still a valid frame if the sector is worth watching, but confidence reflects that.
Confidence Over Time
Implied Returns
Weekly Analysis
Fertilizer thesis dropped sharply from 49% to 21% as supply chains stabilized
Causal Model
Each factor has an estimated probability. Changes propagate through the tree to update overall confidence.
Market Edge Analysis
Contracts where market price diverges from thesis-implied value. Positive edge = market underprices this outcome.
| Contract | Market | Model | Edge | Spread | Depth | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| K | Will CPI rise more than 0.1% in June 2026?YES | 5¢ | 96¢ | +91¢ | 2¢ | 4K/12K |
| K | Will CPI rise more than 0.0% in June 2026?YES | 7¢ | 96¢ | +90¢ | 3¢ | 674.5/924.9100000000001 |
| K | Will there be more than 40 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz from Jun 15, 2026 to Jun 21, 2026?NO | 90¢ | 8¢ | +82¢ | 2¢ | 876.21/243.35 |
| K | Will there be more than 50 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz from Jun 15, 2026 to Jun 21, 2026?NO | 87¢ | 5¢ | +82¢ | 4¢ | 255/267.84000000000003 |
| K | Will there be more than 30 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz from Jun 15, 2026 to Jun 21, 2026?NO | 96¢ | 15¢ | +81¢ | 2¢ | 390.48/678.39 |
| P | Will __ ships transit the Strait of Hormuz on any day by June 30?: 20+NO | 93¢ | 15¢ | +78¢ | 1¢ | 89/269 |
| K | Will there be more than 25 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz from Jun 15, 2026 to Jun 21, 2026?NO | 97¢ | 20¢ | +77¢ | 4¢ | 5K/41.5 |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above or below $2.60 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 6¢ | 80¢ | +74¢ | 10¢ | 27.44/52.56 |
| K | Will Iran’s average daily crude oil production for June 2026 be at least 1.8M bpd?NO | 88¢ | 15¢ | +73¢ | 6¢ | 773.71/344 |
| K | Will the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz as reported by the IMF PortWatch be above 60 before July 1, 2027?NO | 88¢ | 15¢ | +73¢ | 1¢ | 5K/2K |
| K | Will Iran’s average daily crude oil production for June 2026 be at least 1.6M bpd?NO | 91¢ | 20¢ | +71¢ | 7¢ | 541/953 |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be below $3.60 by Dec 31, 2026?NO | 83¢ | 15¢ | +68¢ | 5¢ | 425/715 |
| P | Trump announces US blockade of Hormuz lifted by...?: July 31NO | 82¢ | 15¢ | +67¢ | 2¢ | 1K/808 |
| K | Will CPI rise more than 0.2% in June 2026?YES | 4¢ | 70¢ | +67¢ | 3¢ | 1K/25K |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above $4.80 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 26¢ | 92¢ | +67¢ | 1¢ | 1K/168 |
Recent Evaluations
Automated analysis runs every 15 minutes. Major events trigger immediate re-evaluation.
Thesis confidence declined slightly due to a cooling in long-term inflation and commodity price expectations, which weakens the probability that rural voters will perceive a dramatic and politically b
Thesis confidence experienced a marginal decline to 0.22 as market signals show persistent inflation data balancing against cooling demand metrics and structural supply adjustments for energy, weakeni
Thesis confidence dropped to 0.05 following reports of a signed US-Iran peace agreement, which removes the 'Hormuz blockade' catalyst essential to the entire causal chain.
The thesis confidence remains suppressed as stagflationary pressures (CPI and core inflation) dominate the narrative, overshadowing the specific food-inflation transmission to rural voters envisioned
Thesis confidence dropped to 0.22 as market signals for June CPI and long-term gas prices rise sharply, indicating a broader inflationary environment that likely masks the specific 'fertilizer-to-farm
Thesis confidence declines from 0.25 to 0.20 as the final link in the causal chain—voter salience—continues to erode due to sharply falling energy prices and low CPI prints. While the supply-side bloc
Thesis confidence declined to 0.22 as energy markets (gasoline and WTI) show significant price weakness, which historically buffers rural voters from the salience of fertilizer-driven food inflation.
Thesis confidence decreased slightly (0.24 to 0.22) due to signals of a potential US-Iran peace deal, which compromises the causal chain linking a persistent Hormuz blockade to midterm election outcom
Thesis confidence increased to 0.28, driven by hardening evidence of upstream price pressure via PPI and June CPI tail risks which support the downstream inflation-to-voter-salience transmission path.
Thesis confidence drops to 0.15 as market data confirms a rapid normalization of Hormuz transit and a significant decline in energy costs, neutralizing the political salience of fertilizer-led inflati
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