Can a Hormuz Blockade Flip GOP Farm States in 2026?
Current Assessment
Our causal model estimates 26% probability (started at 22%). Kalshi markets price the top related contract (Will there be more than 10 transit calls through t) at 97¢, while our thesis implies 5¢ — a +92¢ edge. Across 660 tracked contracts, we see systematic mispricing.
Latest evaluation (14h ago): Recent market signals show high volatility in shipping and energy markets, but there is no evidence of the predicted political erosion in farm states, leading to a slight reduction in confidence regarding the downstream electoral impact.
Hormuz blockade disrupts fertilizer supply chains. Fertilizer prices spike, US farm costs surge, food inflation hits rural voters. GOP farm state advantage erodes heading into 2026 midterms. Timeline: planting season → harvest → food prices → November ballots.
Track Record
.042 batting average across 660 contracts with positive avg movement. A useful lens — the market is surfacing the right opportunities, execution varies.
Confidence Over Time
Implied Returns
Weekly Analysis
Fertilizer thesis dropped sharply from 49% to 21% as supply chains stabilized
Causal Model
Each factor has an estimated probability. Changes propagate through the tree to update overall confidence.
Market Edge Analysis
Contracts where market price diverges from thesis-implied value. Positive edge = market underprices this outcome.
| Contract | Market | Model | Edge | Spread | Depth | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| K | Will there be more than 10 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz from Sep 7, 2026 to Sep 13, 2026?NO | 97¢ | 5¢ | +92¢ | 4¢ | 313/9 |
| K | Will there be more than 15 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz from Sep 7, 2026 to Sep 13, 2026?NO | 94¢ | 5¢ | +89¢ | 5¢ | 1K/2K |
| K | How high will the price of fertilizer get this year?YES | 9¢ | 95¢ | +86¢ | 2¢ | 142/320 |
| K | Will the price of natural gas get above $6.00 per million BTU before January 1, 2027?YES | 7¢ | 92¢ | +86¢ | 1¢ | 146.43/152.37 |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above or below $5.20 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 4¢ | 88¢ | +84¢ | 6¢ | 53.16/230.19 |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above or below $5.00 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 7¢ | 90¢ | +84¢ | 5¢ | 576.5699999999999/351.87 |
| P | Iran charges Hormuz fees by...?: October 31YES | 12¢ | 90¢ | +78¢ | 2¢ | 7K/5K |
| K | Will there be more than 20 transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz from Sep 7, 2026 to Sep 13, 2026?NO | 83¢ | 5¢ | +78¢ | 3¢ | 637/341 |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above or below $5.40 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 4¢ | 80¢ | +77¢ | 5¢ | 6.27/224.3 |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above or below $4.80 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 19¢ | 95¢ | +76¢ | 6¢ | 257.96/330.66 |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above or below $2.30 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 4¢ | 80¢ | +76¢ | 2¢ | 305.15999999999997/9K |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above or below $4.90 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 6¢ | 80¢ | +74¢ | 6¢ | 3K/314 |
| K | Will the price of natural gas get above $7.00 per million BTU before January 1, 2027?YES | 7¢ | 80¢ | +74¢ | 5¢ | 83.22/378.51 |
| K | Will exactly 5 House Republican members lose their primary in 2026?YES | 94¢ | 20¢ | -73¢ | 5¢ | 2K/2K |
| K | Will average **gas prices** be above or below $7.00 by Dec 31, 2026?YES | 13¢ | 85¢ | +73¢ | 3¢ | 296.88/60.769999999999996 |
Recent Evaluations
Automated analysis runs every 15 minutes. Major events trigger immediate re-evaluation.
Recent market signals show high volatility in shipping and energy markets, but there is no evidence of the predicted political erosion in farm states, leading to a slight reduction in confidence regar
The thesis remains largely stable as no concrete evidence has invalidated the causal chain; slight confidence increase reflects intensified geopolitical volatility confirming the baseline energy-to-in
Thesis confidence dropped from 0.28 to 0.22 as market data shows a sharp recovery in Hormuz transit volumes and stable GOP polling, while news reports of a ceasefire challenge the 'locked' status of t
Thesis confidence rose slightly to 0.28 as Q1 2026 data confirms fertilizer price spikes of 10-23% and the formalization of Iranian transit fees. While supply chain nodes are effectively locked, the p
Thesis confidence slightly decreased following evidence of persistent resilience in GOP farm-state political metrics and lack of direct translation from fertilizer costs to specific electoral shifts.
Evidence of persistent inflation and energy price sensitivity has slightly bolstered the core transmission nodes, leading to a marginal increase in thesis confidence, though the political consequence
Thesis confidence dropped from 0.38 to 0.32 due to strong market evidence that retail energy prices and July CPI are coming in significantly lower than expected, despite the locked fertilizer supply d
Thesis confidence adjusted to 0.35; while sibling models suggest a deflationary June 2026 CPI print, primary market movements in gas and oil indicators suggest a 'stickier' inflationary regime that ma
Thesis confidence dropped from 0.44 to 0.28 as a collapse in CPI expectations and gas prices (evidenced by 35-49 cent market moves) breaks the link between supply chain shocks and voter salience. Whil
Confidence increased to 0.44 as confirmed Hormuz blockade persistence (n1.2) and fertilizer supply disruptions (n2) flow through to retail food and energy markets. While the political translation (n5,
sf explore fertilizer-shock-farm-crisis