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Will US Ground Invasion of Iran Follow Failed Air Campaign?

Updated 29d ago·archived
⚙ Engine outputInvestment thesis produced by the SimpleFunctions Engine, continuously adversarially checked against live market data. Does not represent any political stance of the company.

Current Assessment

Our causal model estimates 1% probability (started at 47% — significant deterioration). Kalshi markets price the top related contract (What will WTI Crude Oil (WTI) hit in April 2026?: ) at 7.5¢, while our thesis implies 95¢ — a +87.5¢ edge. Across 102 tracked contracts, we see systematic mispricing.

Latest evaluation (29d ago): Thesis confidence drops as multiple mediation channels (Oman, Pakistan) report breakthroughs, directly contradicting the 'no diplomatic off-ramp' core assumption. Market prices for oil and shipping transit have aggressively corrected, suggesting the blockade/invasion narrative is losing its primary

Thesis

The United States will launch a ground invasion of Iran. After 5 weeks of airstrikes, the US faces three compounding pressures: (1) Air power alone cannot destroy Iran's deeply buried nuclear facilities at Fordow and elsewhere — GBU-57 bunker busters have proven insufficient; (2) The Hormuz strait blockade cannot be reliably reopened without ground control of Iran's coastal anti-ship missile and mine infrastructure; (3) Trump's political operating system requires a decisive, visual "mission accomplished" moment to declare victory and exit the war. The market at 53% on Polymarket underprices this scenario. A limited ground operation targeting the coastal strip and key nuclear sites — not full occupation — is the most likely path. The US military has 5 weeks of pre-positioning time and coalition support from Israel and Gulf states.

Confidence
1% ░░░░░░░░░░
Implied Return
+2.1%
Contracts
102tracked

Track Record

Batting Average
.260
Edges Tracked
102
Avg Movement
-6.0¢

.026 batting average across 102 contracts. The lens has been mostly wrong on direction so far — still a valid frame if the sector is worth watching, but confidence reflects that.

Confidence Over Time

0%15%30%
Apr 3Apr 19

Implied Returns

Will the 7-day moving average of daily vessel transit calls as reported by the IMF PortWatch be above 3 on Apr 1, 2026?95¢→50¢+900%
Will average **gas prices** be above or below $5.40 by Dec 31, 2026?12¢→41¢+241.7%
How many ships will Iran successfully target by April 30?: 6–78¢→26.5¢+231.3%
3084¢→50¢+212.5%
4077¢→29¢+208.7%
2583¢→50¢+194.1%
US escorts commercial ship through Hormuz by...?: April 154¢→10.5¢+162.5%
Which countries will send warships through the Strait of Hormuz by April 30?: France3¢→7¢+133.3%

Causal Model

Each factor has an estimated probability. Changes propagate through the tree to update overall confidence.

n1Air power insufficiency for key objectives5%░░░░░░░░░
n1.1Fordow facility survives airstrikes97%██████████
n1.2Iran reconstitutes air defenses32%███░░░░░░░
n1.3Intelligence demands ground presence25%███░░░░░░░
n2Strait of Hormuz cannot be reopened by air/naval power alone0%░░░░░░░░░░
n2.1Iran successfully blockades Hormuz0%░░░░░░░░░░
n2.2Minesweeping insufficient without coastal control12%░░░░░░░░░
n2.3Oil price spike creates economic urgency0%░░░░░░░░░░
n3Domestic political incentives favor ground action0%░░░░░░░░░░
n3.1Trump seeks 'mission accomplished' moment0%░░░░░░░░░░
n3.2Public opinion supports escalation27%███░░░░░░░
n3.3No domestic political constraint blocks invasion10%░░░░░░░░░
n4Military feasibility of limited ground operation88%█████████
n4.1Sufficient force pre-positioning99%██████████
n4.2Limited operation remains limited0%░░░░░░░░░░
n4.3Casualty tolerance exists22%██░░░░░░░░
n5Coalition support enables ground operation15%██░░░░░░░░
n5.1Israel participates in ground operations5%░░░░░░░░░
n5.2Gulf states provide basing and logistics62%██████░░░░
n5.3International diplomatic cover exists12%░░░░░░░░░
n6Escalation dynamics push toward ground war45%█████░░░░░
n6.1Iranian retaliation triggers escalation97%██████████
n6.2Mission creep from special operations42%████░░░░░░
n6.3No diplomatic off-ramp emerges95%██████████

Market Edge Analysis

Contracts where market price diverges from thesis-implied value. Positive edge = market underprices this outcome.

ContractMarketModelEdgeSpreadDepth
PWhat will WTI Crude Oil (WTI) hit in April 2026?: ↑ $120YES8¢95¢+88¢19K/103
PUS-Iran nuclear deal before 2027?NO75¢3¢+72¢4K/3K
KWill the US agree to a new Iranian nuclear deal this year?NO76¢10¢+66¢4K/2K
KWill the US agree to a new Iranian nuclear deal this year?NO68¢3¢+65¢167.67/546.79
PWill the US officially declare war on Iran by...?: December 31YES7¢70¢+64¢54K/10K
PUS-Iran nuclear deal by June 30?NO65¢1¢+64¢2K/1K
KWill average **gas prices** be above $4.30?YES7¢70¢+63¢4K/82
KWill average **gas prices** be above $4.40?YES5¢65¢+61¢13K/2K
PWhat will WTI Crude Oil (WTI) hit in April 2026?: ↑ $130YES5¢65¢+60¢276/1K
KWill the US agree to a new Iranian nuclear deal before August?NO61¢3¢+58¢4K/82
KWill average **gas prices** be above $4.50?YES3¢60¢+57¢1K/3K
PStrait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by end of May?NO62¢8¢+54¢1K/13K
KWill average **gas prices** be above or below $5.00 by Dec 31, 2026?YES22¢75¢+54¢250/206.98000000000002
KWill the US agree to a new Iranian nuclear deal this year?NO55¢3¢+52¢345.11/1K
PWill Trump declare war on Iran by...?: April 30YES4¢55¢+51¢165/60

Recent Evaluations

Automated analysis runs every 15 minutes. Major events trigger immediate re-evaluation.

Apr 19 04:331%(0%)

Thesis confidence drops as multiple mediation channels (Oman, Pakistan) report breakthroughs, directly contradicting the 'no diplomatic off-ramp' core assumption. Market prices for oil and shipping tr

Apr 12 00:342%(-1%)

Recent data reflecting normalized shipping vessel transit calls at the Strait of Hormuz suggests that the blockade risks fueling a ground invasion are lower than previously assumed; confidence lowered

Apr 11 06:035%(+3%)

Thesis confidence remains highly constrained due to market signals suggesting the Strait of Hormuz will remain open (PortWatch vessel transit calls +46c) and a potential diplomatic opening (Irani nucl

Apr 10 13:043%(-3%)

The market is absorbing higher-than-expected throughput data regarding Strait of Hormuz transit, which weakens n2.1; confidence adjusted downward slightly due to persistent lack of bullish confirmatio

Apr 9 02:194%(-8%)

KILL CONDITION TRIGGERED: A confirmed US-Iran ceasefire has been announced, with Pakistan brokering the deal and markets celebrating Hormuz reopening. This directly invalidates the core thesis premise

Apr 8 18:3312%(+10%)

Thesis confidence increased from 0.02 to 0.12 following confirmation that June 2025 airstrikes failed to destroy nuclear targets and reports that the Pentagon is actively planning 'weeks of limited gr

Apr 7 10:352%(-1%)

The single most important development is a report that the U.S. military is actively resisting orders for a ground invasion of Iran, with the Army Chief's removal linked to this resistance. This direc

Apr 6 16:332%(-1%)

No material changes found; recent events and social sentiment are neutral. Thesis confidence slightly lowered due to observed market resistance to volatility pricing.

Apr 5 05:194%(-1%)

KILL CONDITION TRIGGERED: The US has launched airstrikes on Iran's nuclear sites including Fordow and Natanz, fundamentally altering the thesis. The core assumption driving ground invasion — that air

Apr 4 06:058%(-4%)

KILL CONDITION TRIGGERED: The WSJ report that Trump is willing to end the war without reopening the Strait of Hormuz directly destroys two of the three core pillars of this thesis — the Hormuz pressur

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