Will Israel launch a ground operation in Iran by April 30, 2026?

This market has collapsed dramatically from 14¢ to 6¢ over seven days, suggesting either improved geopolitical conditions or market repricing away from escalation risk with only two weeks to expiry. The extreme 41,700% implied yield on "Yes" reflects the severe mispricing typical of tail-risk binary events, though the 0¢ spread and modest $4.4M daily volume indicate thin liquidity that could amplify moves if new information arrives. With a Cliff Risk Index of 16 and realized volatility exceeding 2,700%, this market is highly unstable and sensitive to breaking news, making the 6% probability potentially unreliable as a true risk assessment.

Resolution rules

This market will resolve to "Yes" if participation by Israeli military personnel in a ground operation in Iran on or after February 28, 2026, is confirmed by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. A "ground operation" is defined as a military operation that involves Israeli military ground forces conducting operations within Iranian territory. For the purposes of this market, aerial and maritime operations will not be considered. Only operations involving Israeli troops on the ground within the terrestrial territory of Iran will qualify. Official confirmation by the Israeli military of personnel operating on the ground within Iranian territory during the specified timeframe will resolve this market immediately. An overwhelming consensus of credible reporting confirming that the Israeli military personnel operated on the ground within Iranian territory during the specified timeframe will also suffice. Qualifying confirmations include statements such as the June 25, 2025, statement by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir confirmed that Israeli commando forces operated covertly on the ground inside Iran during the 12-day war. Confirmations referring only to non-military Israeli intelligence activity, including operations by the Mossad or Shin Bet, as well as airstrikes, cyberattacks, standoff weapons, remote sabotage, or actions by proxies or third parties without Israeli military presence, will not alone qualify. Incidents that would not alone suffice include the November 2025 Mossad statement indicating its agents were present during protests in Iran, or the July 31, 2024, assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, widely attributed to Mossad agents. The primary resolution source for this market will be official information by the Israeli military; however, an overwhelming consensus of credible reporting will also suffice.

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