Will Miguel Díaz-Canel leave office before 2026-05-01T14:00:00.000Z
Leader sits at 50% across 3 bound outcomes, runner-up at 30%. This is a winner-take-all market — the headline is the leader’s price, not an arithmetic mean.
Leader probability
Before September 1, 2026
Outcomes
3
winner-take-all
Runner-up
30¢
Before August 1, 2026
Spread
20pp
contested
24h volume
$5K
modest
Closes
Sep 1, 2026
86 days
Venue
Kalshi
3 bound
30-day trend
Bracket family
How the bracket ladder is priced.
Each row is one outcome on the venue. Sorted by 24h volume — the heaviest book is at the top.
Cluster 1
Will Miguel Díaz-Canel leave office before 2026-0
Will Miguel Díaz-Canel leave office before 2026-07-01T14:00:00.000Z?: Before July 1, 2026
KXDIAZOUT-MDC-26JUL01
Will Miguel Díaz-Canel leave office before 2026-09-01T14:00:00.000Z?: Before September 1, 2026
KXDIAZOUT-MDC-26SEP01
Will Miguel Díaz-Canel leave office before 2026-08-01T14:00:00.000Z?: Before August 1, 2026
KXDIAZOUT-MDC-26AUG01
Analysis
This market estimates a 41% probability that Miguel Díaz-Canel, Cuba's president, will leave office before May 1, 2026—a date that has now passed. The contract appears to reflect historical uncertainty about political transitions in Cuba, where leadership changes have been rare but significant when they occur. The probability level suggests markets assign meaningful but minority odds to an unexpected departure, whether through health issues, political crisis, or institutional change. Key drivers would include Díaz-Canel's age and reported health status, domestic economic conditions, and any signs of internal party conflict. The resolution of this contract depends on verifiable confirmation of a leadership transition, which would require either official Cuban government statements or widely documented evidence of a change in executive authority.
- ›Díaz-Canel's current health status and age (born 1960), which affects succession risk from natural causes
- ›Cuba's economic conditions and social stability, which could trigger political instability or forced transitions
- ›Evidence of internal power struggles within Cuba's government or Communist Party leadership
- ›International diplomatic developments or sanctions changes that might alter regime stability
- ›Verifiable public documentation or official statements confirming any change in executive authority
What moved the line
- Jun 1Before August 1, 2026↓9pp45→36¢ · Kalshi
- Jun 2Before July 1, 2026↓6pp18→12¢ · Kalshi
- Jun 4Before July 1, 2026↑5pp8→13¢ · Kalshi
- Jun 3Before September 1, 2026↓5pp53→48¢ · Kalshi
- Jun 3Before July 1, 2026↓4pp12→8¢ · Kalshi
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These markets stopped trading. Last odds and any captured outcome are shown above — full settlement detail lives at the venue.
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How we compute these odds
SimpleFunctions aggregates live prediction-market contracts from Kalshi and Polymarket. Each slug groups contracts that resolve on the same underlying event, identified by venue event_id.
For binary slugs, the headline probability is the liquidity-weighted mid-price across all bound contracts. For multi-outcome slugs (e.g. elections with 3+ candidates), the headline is the leader’s price; we never arithmetically average disjoint outcomes — that would produce a number with no real-world meaning.
Snapshots refresh every 5 minutes during market hours; daily aggregates are computed at 04:00 UTC. The 30-day sparkline is drawn from per-ticker daily means stored in market_indicator_daily; 24h delta and movement events are derived from the same source.
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